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Abstract
The aim of this article is to make a case for Aristotelian friendship as a ‘method’ of moral 
education qua mutual character development. After setting out some Aristotelian assump-
tions about friendship and education (and revising some of those) in the “Aristotle and 
Beyond: Some Basics about Character Friendship and Education”section , I devote the 
“Role-Model Moral Education Contrasted with Learning from Character Friends” section 
to role modelling and how it differs from the idea of cultivating character through friend-
ships. “The Mechanisms of Learning from Character Friends” section then explores the 
mechanisms of Aristotelian friendship education directly: those identified by him and those 
which can be elicited more obliquely from his texts. I end in the “Concluding Remarks and 
Classroom Applications” section with some reflections on how this model of friendship as 
a moral method could be applied in current educational contexts. While the idea of char-
acter friendship as an educational method comes with many assets, it also imports various 
liabilities that may lead to painful friendship terminations. I have put the spotlight on those 
liabilities in two previous articles. In contrast, the goal here is to impart a new edge and 
added force to the idea that a certain Aristotle-defined type of deep friendships may have 
a unique role to play in facilitating moral growth, above and beyond other developmental 
learning mechanisms.
Keywords Friendship as an educational method · Aristotle · Character friendships · Role 
models · Mechanisms of friendship education
Introduction: Friendship and Moral Education
I deliberately chose a provocative title for this article by referring to friendship as a 
‘method’ of moral education, albeit in scare quotes. The title is provocative for two rea-
sons. One is that nowhere does Aristotle himself refer to his highest type of friendship, 
namely ‘character friendship’ (nor indeed any lower type), as a ‘method’. However, bear 
in mind that the Nicomachean Ethics is a manual on making wise choices and living well, 
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and there is a strong educational thread running through it, from beginning to end. I will 
be arguing later that moral education (or, more narrowly construed, the cultivation of good 
character) is the raison d’être of character friendship. Lubricating the slide from that argu-
ment to the use of the word ‘method’ is the fact that two of the ten books of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics and nearly a third of the Eudemian Ethics are devoted to friendship’s recog-
nisably ethical nature, its educational ramifications and the proper or improper reasons for 
its termination. Aristotle wrote all of that before the time of explicit theories of educational 
methods. However, only plodding docility before these ancient texts would debar us from 
giving his account of friendship a more direct educational spin by couching it in the current 
language of educational methods.
The second reason why the title may seem provocative is that whereas the standard view 
of friendship—dating back to no other than Aristotle himself—is that friendship has intrin-
sic value, talk of it as a ‘method’ smacks of instrumentalisation: the reduction of its value 
to extrinsic benefits. However, here is a helpful analogy. It is well known that Aristotle 
mentions music as a method of moral education (or, more precisely, of emotion regulation 
which is a foundation of balanced character development) in his Politics. It could well be 
that music only carries those benefits for people who, antecedently, appreciate the intrinsic 
worth of music. There is thus no incoherence in supposing that the same thing can have 
both non-instrumental and instrumental value (take health as another telling example). For 
character friendship, at least, as we see later, Aristotle makes the strong demand that it not 
be entered into directly for its presumed utility in improving character; we have to grant its 
intrinsic value first by loving the friend for her own sake.
Now, while reams have been written about Aristotle’s theory of friendship and there is 
a current bandwagon of interest in Aristotelian or Aristotle-inspired methods of character 
education, few attempts have been made to bring the two literatures together (as correctly 
pointed out by Hoyos-Valdés 2018), at least for practical educational purposes as distinct 
from moral theoretical ones (see Cooper 1977, and Brewer 2005, for examples of the lat-
ter). At the same time, another related Aristotelian method, about which Aristotle actually 
says much less, namely the emulation of moral exemplars (aka moral role modelling), has 
become the hottest ticket in town, with major recent contributions from within moral phi-
losophy (Zagzebski 2017), moral psychology (Damon and Colby 2015), moral education 
(see a special issue of Journal of Moral Education, ed. by Campodonico et al. 2019) and 
even popular trade books (Brooks 2015). I am only able to offer educated guesses about the 
reasons why. Perhaps modern amoral (e.g. aestheticised, see Nehamas 2016) conceptions 
of friendship have blinded us to its moral value; perhaps role-model methods are easier 
to administer in formal educational contexts as ‘interventions’ than the cultivation of (the 
right kind of) friendship; perhaps friendship as a ‘method’ cannot be fully understood or 
operationalised without making sense simultaneously of advanced phronesis development, 
which has baffled many moral educators because of its sheer complexity (Darnell et  al. 
2019).
Whatever the reason, the main aim of this article is to make a case for Aristotelian 
friendship as a method of moral education qua mutual character development. After setting 
out some Aristotelian assumptions about friendship and moral education (and updating/
revising those where necessary) in the following section, I devote the third section to role 
modelling and how it differs from the idea of cultivating character through friendships. The 
fourth section then explores the mechanisms of Aristotelian friendship education directly: 
those identified by him and those which can be elicited more obliquely from his texts. I 
conclude in the final section with some reflections on how this model of friendship as a 
‘moral method’ could be applied in current educational contexts.
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The idea of character friendship as a moral educational method comes, I argue, with 
many assets. However, it also imports various liabilities that may lead to (often painful) 
friendship ruptures. In two previous articles I have put the spotlight on those liabilities: 
both the general shortcomings of Aristotle’s fairly romanticised account of character friend-
ship (Kristjánsson 2019) and how those shortcomings may play out in the educational 
arena: arresting rather than furthering moral development (Kristjánsson 2020a). Because 
of this previous ground-clearing work—which I refer to at various junctures but refrain 
from reproducing here—I allow myself to be somewhat upbeat in this article. The current 
aim is simply to impart a new edge and added force to the idea that a certain Aristotle-
defined type of deep and close friendships may have a unique role to play in facilitating 
moral growth, above and beyond, for instance, methods of moral-exemplar emulation. That 
this type of friendship also has its shadow sides is a topic no less worthy of examination 
and caution, but such an examination is not on today’s agenda.
Aristotle and Beyond: Some Basics about Character Friendship 
and Education
Friendship for Aristotle is conscious ‘reciprocated goodwill’ (1985, p. 210 [1155b32–35]). 
It assumes three main types, where the first two (friendships for pleasure and utility) are 
‘incomplete’—because of their essentially extrinsically valuable and transitory natures—
but the most developed type (character friendships) is ‘complete’ because of its unique 
intrinsic and enduring nature (1985, pp. 211ff [1156a6ff]). Notably, pleasure and util-
ity friendships are necessary for smooth human association, and they will continue even 
among those who have formed character friendships. While ‘base’ people can actualise 
them, but not the complete type, ‘good’ (namely virtuous) people enjoy all three types 
in different contexts but most specifically the complete type (1985, pp. 212 and 216 
[1156b6–8 and 1157b1–4]). Aristotle makes it a necessary conceptual condition of all the 
three (genuine) types of friendship that to ‘a friend […] you must wish good for his own 
sake’ (1985, p. 210 [1155b31–32]). Nevertheless, once the raison d’être of the two incom-
plete types (of being mutually advantageous or mutually pleasurable) is lost, they dissolve 
fairly easily (as opposed to character friendship) despite the intrinsic goodwill which sus-
tains them while they last.
Apart from the features they share with the incomplete types, character friendships 
present some unique features of their own. For example, they involve (a) spending time 
together in shared activities, (b) sharing joys and sorrows, (c) loving the friend for her own 
sake in the form of loving her character (as her set of virtues), (d) soulmateship in the 
strong sense of being ‘related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another 
himself’ (1985, p. 246 [1166a30–33]; cf. pp. 260 and 265 [1170b6–7; 1172a32–34]) and 
(e) viewing the friendship as intrinsically valuable to the extent of seeing the friend as 
irreplaceable, not only painfully replaceable as in the more developed forms of utility 
friendships.
Notice that apart from the clause ‘in the form of loving her character…’ in (c), all 
these features do, or at least could, show up as attributes of any so-called ‘deep’ or ‘close’ 
friendships as they are commonly understood nowadays by those without any ready-made 
Aristotelian philosophy in their pockets. This is why, although the present article happens 
to be set in the context of Aristotle’s friendship typology, it is not necessary to buy into 
all the conceptual conditions that Aristotle places on his narrowly defined kind of ‘deep’ 
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friendships to appreciate most of the points made in what follows as being about the moral 
educational role of any such friendships—more broadly specified. That said, even notions 
of ‘deep’ friendships as commonly understood by lay people, while not explicitly Aristo-
telian, tend to owe a lot to the Aristotelian account, as almost all historical discussions of 
friendships—which have then percolated down into everyday understandings—take Aris-
totle as their point of departure.
The above list of the defining features of character friendships notwithstanding, and 
especially the unique Aristotelian one of loving the friend’s character, we have not really 
established yet what character friendships are essentially for, in the same sense as we did 
above in noting the raison d’être of pleasure and utility friendships. The standard answer 
in current psychological theories of deep friendships is to fasten on the psychological inti-
macy involved in features (b) and (d) and postulate that the aim of friendship is to uti-
lise this intimacy in the service of psychological wellbeing (typically defined subjectively 
and non-morally) and psychological health (critiqued e.g. by Fowers and Anderson 2018). 
The Aristotelian answer, in contrast, draws on (c) and especially the ‘loving her character’ 
clause. The Aristotelian raison d’être of character friendships is, arguably, both moral and 
educational. The aim of such friendships is not only the love of character per se, but lov-
ing it in the service of mutual character development. Character friends become ‘better 
from their activities and their mutual correction’ as ‘each moulds the other’, and through 
this mutual moulding they become ‘more capable of understanding and acting’ (1985, pp. 
266 and 208 [1172a11–14 and 1155a15–16]). Friendship of this kind educates by being, 
in various ways, knowledge-enhancing, virtue-enhancing and life-enhancing, through the 
friends acting as each other’s procreators on the trajectory towards full phronesis (Telfer 
1970–1971, pp. 239–240). The dynamics of how exactly this happens, and how it can be 
made to happen more effectively throughè educational interventions, is a topic for the final 
two sections. For the time being, we can make do with Brewer’s crisp illumination of this 
raison d’être as having to do with how ‘friends draw each other out and participate in the 
fine-toothed articulation of each other’s character’ (2005, p. 726).
Three caveats are in order at this juncture. The first is that this account of the rai-
son d’être of Aristotelian character friendships is not indisputable because Aristotle 
never says explicitly that the fundamental aim of such friendships is developmental-
cum-educational. However, given the remarks at the beginning of this article about the 
educational nature of his ethical works, readers will know where I am coming from. 
Apart from that general point, Aristotle says quite a lot about how friendship in fact 
educates, and for a dyed-in-the-wool naturalist like himself, there is a short step from 
‘is’ to ‘ought’. Second, although I fasten on character friendship is this article, there 
would be a case for arguing that the lower types of friendships, especially friendship 
for utility, can have moral educational value also. For example, a utility friend may help 
me to stay self-controlled when facing tribulations rather than lapsing into despond-
ency or vice (say, by deciding to end my life). Third, non-character based accounts of 
deep friendships are also capable of postulating strong educational aims. For example, 
aestheticised accounts, with historic representations in authors as distinct as Montaigne 
and Nietzsche, could—in principle—assume that such friendships help develop our aes-
thetic sensibilities and sensitivities in a way that is educationally salient, albeit amoral. 
Nevertheless—in practice—proponents of aestheticised accounts tend to downplay 
friendship’s educational role. For example, Nehamas (2016, p. 199) says that even close 
friendships ‘are often less edifying than the rhetoric that surrounds the institution would 
have them be’ and that ‘the bulk of our interactions with friends are, at least at first 
sight, trivial and inconsequential’. The worry seems to be here that if one acknowledges 
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education as the raison d’être of deep friendship, one risks letting a moralised (Aristote-
lian or quasi-Aristotelian) account slip in through the back door.
Despite his famous academic patricide on Plato, Aristotle shares his mentor’s pen-
chant for defining concepts—initially at least—with respect to their most perfect instan-
tiations. Thus, Aristotle makes an early comment about complete (namely, character-
based) friendships (1985, p. 212 [1156b6–8]) that has often been interpreted to mean 
that such friendships are possible only between people who are not only, as he says, 
‘similar in virtue’, but also equal in social standing, and even already both of perfect 
virtue (namely fully fledged phronimoi). While that is clearly his ideal instantiation, 
Aristotle spends considerable space in the following discussion delineating friendships 
that are complete while not perfect: namely, character friendships among people who 
are socially unequal in various ways—given the specific power dynamics in ancient 
Greek society—and/or on the path towards full phronesis rather than phronimoi gradu-
ates already. As Cooper adamantly puts it, ‘it is clear that Aristotle is willing to coun-
tenance a virtue-friendship where both parties are quite deficient with respect to their 
appropriate excellences’ (1977, p. 628). Nevertheless, the relevant parties cannot be too 
bad (fully vicious) nor indeed too good (divinely virtuous like gods) for the character 
friendship to work as veritable soulmateship.
All these conceptual demarcations create in the end what I have elsewhere called a ‘zone 
of proximal development of character friendships’: the zone in which moral (character) 
education can take place (Kristjánsson 2020a). Somewhat paradoxically, people at the very 
top of this zone—the perfect phronimoi friends—threaten to undermine my thesis about 
mutual character development as the raison d’être of character friendship, because—as 
perfect ethical agents—the phronimoi, ex hypothesi, need no further development. Rather, 
they ‘affirm each other’s evaluative outlooks ‘unreservedly and unconditionally’ and 
engage in a ‘running appreciation’ of their ‘jointly produced sensibilities’ (Brewer 2005, 
pp. 726, 730, 758). It is worth correcting Aristotle’s idealism here, pointing out that he 
should have been more mindful of his own examples of how even the highly virtuous can 
go wrong (Kristjánsson 2020a, cf. Curzer 2005). So, on a plausible Aristotelian account 
(although not Aristotle’s own), the phronimoi would still need lifelong moral education 
in the ordinary sense to keep their character boats steady. Furthermore, the phronmoi are, 
through their character friendships, engaging in flourishing-enhancing activities by enjoy-
ing the specific kinds of pleasures that attach themselves, subsequently, to successful char-
acterological achievements. They are, so to speak, savouring the icing on the educational 
cake, which may also count as an educational activity of a sort: namely its culmination.
More relevant for present purposes are, however, three cohorts of people—all budding 
rather than fully developed phronimoi—who engage in character friendships that are essen-
tially moral educational on a more standard understanding. Those are people of (a) equal 
social status who are either (a1) equal in virtue or (a2) unequal in virtue, and (b) peo-
ple of unequal social status who are unequal in virtue. Notably, Aristotle presupposes that 
inequality of social status implies inequality in virtue although equality of social status 
does not guarantee virtue equality: a highly contentious assumption (which must be under-
stood against the background of Aristotle’s own highly stratified society; see Kristjánsson 
2019). Consider, for (a), two undergraduates who become friends as freshmen and help 
each other grow in virtue, either because, (a1) being equal in virtue at the outset, they share 
experiences on parallel tracks, or (a2) because the one who is more virtuous at the begin-
ning helps the other catch up while also developing herself. For (b), consider a professor/
teacher/mentor and a student who both grow morally from their mutual interactions but 
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where the former has more to give in terms of moral knowledge, yet more to take back in 
terms of morally deserved and commendable gratitude.
Empirically minded educators will obviously want to know what age ranges we are talk-
ing about here. It would be untenable, according to Aristotle, to claim that very young 
children are capable of character friendship (although Aristotle is usually not precise in 
giving age limits for developmental transitions). Such friendship presupposes some mini-
mal ‘comprehension or [at least] perception’ of the moral character of the other to be cher-
ished and admired (Aristotle 1985, p. 230 [1161b26–7]). Other than that, Aristotle is at 
his most elusive here. He does say that, while the old and ‘sour’ are prone to mere utility 
friendships in order to make sure they are cared for, the cause of friendship between young 
people ‘seems to be pleasure’ (1985, p. 212 [1156a31–33], and 216 [1157b14–15]; cf. 
1935, p. 371 [1236a35–37]). On the other hand, he also states that ‘the young need [friend-
ship] to keep them from error’ (1985, p. 208 [1155a10–13]), and he is clearly not talking 
about friendship for pleasure there. He later takes the example of parent–child associations 
as a paradigmatic case of unequal friendships, and he seems to be talking about charac-
ter friendships there because he says that this sort of friendship ‘also’ includes pleasure 
and utility (1985, p. 231 [1162a4–9]). Despite this textual evidence, the standard view is 
that Aristotle did not consider children capable of character friendships (see e.g. Jacquette 
2001) because they do not really possess virtues yet as relatively stable (but amenable to 
further development) traits of character. The apparently clear reference to parent–child 
friendships is then typically written off on grounds of the fact that the word philia in 
ancient Greek could also cover parental love.
This article is not meant to constitute an exercise in Aristotelian exegesis, but I can-
not resist the temptation to remark that the standard exegetical view seems fairly weak. In 
the Rhetoric, Aristotle unambiguously refers to some ‘virtues’ that virtuous adults should 
ideally possess but do come more easily to young people for reasons of developmental 
psychology. The young are thus typically open-minded and optimistic, tending to look at 
the good side rather than the bad side of things, as they have not yet ‘seen much wick-
edness’. They trust others readily ‘because of not yet having been much deceived’. They 
are also more courageous and guileless than the old are, and have more exalted notions, 
not having yet been ‘worn down by life’. Moreover, they are fonder of their friends than 
older people are and have not come to value them for their usefulness (2007, pp. 149–150 
[1389a16–b3]). The virtues referred to here are obviously not phronesis-infused virtues, 
but rather what Aristotle would designate as ‘merely habituated’ ones, but they are virtues 
nevertheless, making up character (cf. Kristjánsson 2007, Chap. 8). I think Aristotle would 
most likely have seconded the observation made by one of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s 
characters that ‘one does not love one’s children just because they are one’s children but 
because of the friendship formed while raising them’ (1988, p. 211).
Parent–child friendships aside, and whatever Aristotle’s view may have been, current 
empirical evidence seems to indicate that, at least in late childhood, children may be capa-
ble of mutually edifying character friendships (cf. Healy 2011, for an even-handed discus-
sion of the literature, pro and con). For example, an empirical study of 9–10 year old chil-
dren in the UK (Walker et al. 2016) revealed that those children often claimed to identify 
and choose friends on the grounds of their moral qualities, more specifically virtues such 
as honesty, generosity, helpfulness and kindness. Indeed, ‘the language of virtue seemed to 
come naturally to many of the children’ (2016, p. 296; cf. Wagner 2019, for similar find-
ings about early adolescents). Notably, the authors refer to the sort of friendship described 
by many of their respondents as ‘eudaimonic friendship’, perhaps to avoid the strictness of 
the criteria associated with Aristotelian ‘character friendship’ and of becoming embroiled 
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in exegetical debates. Nevertheless, I consider their evidence to add backbone to the view 
that the educative value of character friendship can emerge prior to adolescence—a view 
which also suggests a more optimistic view of the usefulness of reflective moral education 
among fairly young people than that often ascribed to Aristotle (e.g. by Burnyeat 1980).
Role‑Model Moral Education Contrasted with Learning from Character 
Friends
Hoyos-Valdés (2018, p. 66) argues in a challenging paper that the ‘overemphasis on role 
models is misguided and misleading, and a good antidote draws on the Aristotelian concept 
of character friendship’. What she is referring to here is the discourse in current (mostly 
Aristotle-inspired) character-education discourse on how we develop our virtues through 
engagement with inspiring individuals. As I noted at the beginning, this discourse is—in 
direct contrast to Aristotle’s own emphasis—almost exclusively about role-model educa-
tion as distinct from learning from character friends. While, as always, there is no reason 
to take Aristotle as gospel on any of those issues, his conceptualisations are well suited, 
as ever, to serve as starting points of the discussion, if only because of their historical 
importance.
The current discourse on role-model education, insofar as it is conducted within a char-
acter-education tradition, typically draws on Aristotle’s well-defined emotion of emulation 
(zelos), or emulousness as a trait. Emulation, says Aristotle, is
a kind of distress at the apparent presence among others like him by nature, of things 
honoured and possible for a person to acquire, [with the distress arising] not from the 
fact that another has them but that the emulator does not (thus emulation is a good 
thing and characteristic of good people, while envy is bad and characteristic of the 
bad; for the former [person], through emulation, is making an effort to attain good 
things for himself, while the latter, through envy, tries to prevent his neighbour from 
having them) (2007, p. 146 [1388a29–38]).
Emulation, as we gradually learn from Aristotle (cf. Kristjánsson 2007, Chap. 7), is an 
unusual emotion in that, although its valence is overall negative, that is distressful, with the 
pain being caused by the emulator’s perceived inferiority vis-à-vis the emulated person (i.e. 
the role model, in today’s language), it is overall positively evaluating in that the emulator 
prefers the option of the role model retaining her superiority over the option of surpassing 
her by making her inferior. What the emulator wants is just to equal the role model, not to 
supersede her or take anything away from her; this is why emulation must be strictly dis-
tinguished from the overall negatively evaluating emotions of envy and begrudging spite.
Aristotle is not terribly enlightening in explaining the psychological mechanisms lead-
ing from emulation to the internalisation of the emulated characteristics of the role model. 
However, by tidying up his account and adding bits and pieces to it where necessary, it is 
possible to make sense of those mechanisms, at least in rough outline (see Zagzebski 2017; 
Kristjánsson 2020b, Chap. 7). One can thus hypothesise that the process of role model-
ling starts with the overall positively valenced admiration of an exemplar, which leads to a 
conception of oneself as lacking the admired qualities but desiring to possess them, which 
in turn evokes emulation—that is, as long as the admiration is strong enough to elicit inspi-
ration rather than just inert admiration from a distance of some glorious hero, deemed far 
beyond reach. Notably, admiration and inspiration do not feature in the simply story that 
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Aristotle tells about the emulation of moral exemplars; those emotions will need to be 
added to make the story more psychologically nuanced and plausible. I have elsewhere 
complained about the lack of attention in Aristotle (and, for that matter, in the revisionary 
account by Zagzebski 2017, also) of another route to moral learning: elevation vis-à-vis 
abstract moral ideals where one is inspired, so to speak, by exemplarity itself rather than an 
exemplar (Kristjánsson 2020b, Chap. 7). However, I have another complaint to make here, 
drawing on Hoyos-Valdés general misgiving (2018, p. 67) about reducing all moral learn-
ing from inspiring others (including character friends) to Aristotle’s emulation-model or 
Zagzebski’s admiration-emulation one.
Sherman (1987, p. 610) explicitly states that character friends ‘are eminently suited as 
models for emulation’. Although this claim follows her rehearsal of Aristotle’s zelos, it is 
not entirely clear whether Sherman is using ‘emulation’ in Aristotle’s technical sense or a 
broader colloquial sense in which it simply indicates that character friends are ideal models 
for moral learning. While the latter is somewhat platitudinous if one endorses Aristotle’s 
view of what character friends are for, the former claim is problematic because it falls afoul 
of the following intuition that I hope readers share with me. It strains credulity towards 
the breaking point to think of the way our character develops through interactions with 
friends simply in terms of positively valenced admiration and negatively valenced emula-
tion. I may be inspired to internalise the virtue of forgiveness to an enhanced extent by 
admiring Nelson Mandela’s display of it, and then feeling inadequate in not matching him 
in this respect. However, given the psychological intimacy with a character friend and the 
idea of her as ‘another self’, it seems simplistic, at best, perverse, at worst, to consider my 
gradual internalisation of a stronger trait of forgiveness through my interactions with her in 
terms of simply, on the one hand, admiring her from the outside, as it were, and then, on 
the other, feeling bad that I am not as developed as her qua forgiver. This model may work 
perfectly for what are normally called ‘role models’ (of the Nelson Mandela or Mother 
Teresa kind) in the character-education literature, but surely the psychological mechanisms 
of learning from a character friend are much more complex, having to do with the affection 
shared between the two parties, to the extent that my relationship with her is qualitatively 
more advanced than the one I have with the standard role model.
I will try to entangle some of the possible mechanisms involved in learning from a char-
acter friend in the following section. However, to make initial sense of the conceptual and 
empirical distinctions that I want to draw, I am persuaded to offer here a model of per-
sons as sources of character development (seen from the perspective of the beneficiary, 
see Table 1) that involves considerable tightenings of ordinary language, in the service of 
clarification and precision, especially with regard to the concepts of a role model and a 
moral exemplar (as a ‘good’ role model). Notably, I am no great fan of radical departures 
from the common usage of terms, however unsystematic it may be, inter alia because such 
departures can easily trap theorists inside ivory towers and hinder practical applications. 
Table 1  Persons as sources of character development
Morally equal 
character friend
Morally unequal (superior) char-
acter friend
Morally superior non-character 
friend
Role model ∅ ∅ Moral exemplar, e.g. Nelson 
Mandela
Non-role model Soulmate Mentor, e.g. parent, teacher, pro-
fessor, more virtuous peer
(Lots of people who might, but do 
not, influence me)
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However, I ask readers to bear with me, for the purposes of the present article, and give the 
following conceptual distinctions a fair hearing, even though they may not like the particu-
lar terms I use to convey them.
Recall that, for Aristotle, a relationship with a friend must be entered into non-instru-
mentally: for example, not with the primary intention of securing incremental character 
gain rubbed off from the friend. Moreover, the goodwill must be reciprocated: the friend 
must value/love me in the same non-instrumental way as I value/love her. In unequal 
friendships Aristotle adds the condition that the stronger party be ‘loved more than he 
loves, for when the loving reflects the comparative worth of friends, equality is achieved 
in a way’ (1985, p. 221 [1158b26–29]), but this does not subvert the point that the stronger 
party also loves the weaker one non-instrumentally.
In contrast, then, let me stipulate that a relationship with a role model is (a) instrumental 
in nature: initiated for the sake of character development and (b) asymmetric (or unilateral) 
in the sense that the (perceived) benefactor is not also at the same time a beneficiary of the 
(perceived) relationship, nor reciprocates the beneficiary’s feelings. This obviously rules 
out the possibility that a role model can also be a character friend, which narrows down 
the ordinary-language meaning of ‘role model’—although it still allows for the possibility 
that a role model can be a friend for utility and/or pleasure. Unequal character friends may 
seem to present an intermediate case, in terms of psychological proximity versus distance, 
but they still count as ‘friends’ rather than ‘role models’ in the above model because they 
fail to satisfy conditions (a) and (b) for role models. I think the term ‘mentor’ is most felici-
tously reserved for those friends.
In this model, a role model is a non-character friend, and insofar as she is morally supe-
rior to the beneficiary, she counts as a ‘moral exemplar’. Parents, teachers and professors 
can fall into this category but, ex hypothesi in the present model, only in those cases where 
they are not character friends of the beneficiaries. This model may seem to have the coun-
ter-intuitive implication that common claims about a parent being at the same time ‘my 
best friend and my greatest role model’ do not make sense anymore. However, the reason 
we find this implication counter-intuitive is, I submit, because of our impoverished lan-
guage in describing the mechanisms of learning to develop one’s character through inter-
actions with friends qua mentors rather than role models, and because of how bloated the 
term ‘role model’ has become in everyday discourse. The aim of this model is not so much 
to close down linguistic avenues as to open up new ones, which will be explored in the fol-
lowing section.
It is well known from the role-model literature that role modelling is a rickety ladder to 
climb because of the inter-related threats of uncritical hero-worship, moral over-stretching 
and moral inertia (Vos 2018; Kristjánsson 2020b, Chap. 7). There is good reason to conjec-
ture that those threats will be mitigated when the benefactors are morally superior charac-
ter friends (mentors) rather than just role models, precisely because of the greater psycho-
logical intimacy and mutual self-knowledge among character friends, where co-ordination 
with the friend replaces conformation to a role model (cf. Hoyos-Valdés 2018, p. 77).
Finally, in this model, I reserve the term ‘soulmate’ for a morally equal character friends 
from whom one learns to self-improve. There is nothing wrong as such with a broader 
understanding of ‘soulmate’ as covering all character friends qua kindred spirits (as I 
used the term earlier in this article); my intention is not to disrespect ordinary language by 
recoiling from it and suggesting that it must be replaced, across the board, with a new tech-
nical vocabulary. We simply need a handy term, in this model, to operationalise the notion 
of a morally equal character friend as a character developmental benefactor, and ‘soulmate’ 
fits that purpose well in this particular instance.
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The Mechanisms of Learning from Character Friends
No one has, to the best of my knowledge, written in any detail about how one develops 
one’s character through interactions with close friends, let alone ‘character friends’ in the 
specific Aristotelian sense (barring some general suggestions in Telfer 1970–1971, and 
Hoyos-Valdés 2018). Despite its underlying educational focus, what Aristotle says about 
this himself is very meagre. In the absence of either a clear theory or specific empirical 
evidence, this section, on the putative mechanisms of learning from character friends, must 
therefore be seen as exploratory and tentative. I have in mind for now mainly examples of 
equal character friendships qua soulmateships. Most of what I say could plausibly apply 
to unequal character friendships as mentorships also, but further caveats and conditions 
would then have to be added for which there is no space here. Drawing broadly on the spirit 
rather than the letter of Aristotle’s account, I propose to separate the mechanisms in ques-
tion into three categories: emotional, cognitive-linguistic, and epistemological.
Character friendships arguably involve an emotional connection that is uniquely condu-
cive to moral learning in terms of character improvement. The pride of place that Aristotle 
gives to emotions as part of the good life is well known (Kristjánsson 2018). While he does 
not single out emotions that are specific to character friendships, some candidates suggest 
themselves easily. The one I will focus on here is trust and, most notably here, mutual trust. 
A moral learner can also place trust in an elevated role model, but in most cases such trust 
will not be mutual; the standard role model may not even be personally acquainted with the 
learner. Trust is an essential emotion in some non-friendship-based social relationships, 
such as between a doctor and a patient, but there it is grounded in quite different motiva-
tional and dispositional structures to friendship and manifests itself differently (cf. Cocking 
and Oakley 1995, pp. 93–94). The unique feature of mutual trust, which is grounded in 
psychological intimacy and soulmateship, is that it steadies the mind, by providing what 
could be called existential security, and lowers psychological barriers of self-disclosure 
and self-receptivity, some of which are inimical to moral learning. For example, to meet 
someone who unhesitatingly bears moral witness to her faults and the temptations that she 
is facing can be an eye-opening experience for someone fighting the same demons. It will 
all be part of a mutual learning journey.
The second mechanism of learning that I propose to highlight here is linguistic and/
or cognitive and has to do with the mutual corrections that take place between friends as 
they discuss or debate their understandings of virtue terms (facilitating ‘virtue literacy’) 
and how the virtues are best applied in daily life. Mary Healy puts this in terms of young 
friends learning to practise their non-egoistic ‘moral reasoning’ with one another (2011, p. 
449). There is an old saw that dialogue is only a Socratic, not an Aristotelian, method of 
moral education, but that seems ludicrous even when we think of early-years Aristotelian 
habituation with a moral tutor (who will surely explain her moral exhortations rather than 
just rely on the carrot and the stick), and even more so when we think of the advanced 
cultivation of phronesis-guided virtue that is ideally instantiated among character friends 
(Kristjánsson 2015, Chap. 6).
The notion of a ‘critical friend’ is paramount here—with the friend being not only a 
supporter but also a challenger (Gibbs and Angelides 2008). While that ideal may seem 
more at home in unequal character friendships, where the mentor gently ‘corrects’ the men-
tee, any constructive dialogue between equal character friends about how to deal with life’s 
exigencies will involve critical engagement with the friend’s point of view. Otherwise the 
friendship degenerates into what Brewer calls a ‘static and complacent mutual admiration 
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society’ (2005, p. 726) and its very raison d’être is lost. As Cicero put it, to ‘graciously give 
and receive criticism is the mark of true friendship’ (2018, p. 155). Accepting criticism 
may even become a catalyst for profound epiphanic self-transformation (although Aristotle 
himself was sceptical of radical self-change in adulthood, see Kristjánsson 2020b, Chap. 
6). To accept, unquestioningly, the friend’s character flaws, without trying to correct them, 
is not a sign of true character friendship but rather its opposite: an attitude that in today’s 
academic parlance would probably best be referred to as unhealthy ‘co-dependency’. The 
critical engagement required by true friendship would, by Aristotle’s lights, be guided by a 
mutual recognition of objective normativity inherent in the natural world in which we live. 
While understanding a soulmate involves understanding that person’s unique self-narra-
tive (Hoyos-Valdés 2018, p. 71), it thus also involves understanding that narrative against 
the background of shared character-relevant values. Nehamas’s point (Nehamas 2016, p. 
76, drawing on C. S. Lewis 1960), on how, in painting, friends tend both to look ahead, 
whereas lovers stare into each other’s eyes, may be seen to represent this commitment to 
a common moral vision which is not only subjective, and not even relational in a dyadic 
sense, but lies beyond personal selfhood.
Speaking of ‘selfhood’ brings us neatly towards the third learning mechanism that I 
wish to foreground here, which I call the epistemological one, by drawing on Aristotle’s 
much-cited locution of the friend as ‘another self’. Debates have raged about whether Aris-
totle meant this simply as a poetic metaphor (i.e., about being as close as one can be to 
another person), or whether he was making a psychological claim (about the nature of kin-
dred-spiritedness) or even an ontological one (about selfhood being somehow a relational 
concept). I will avoid getting embroiled in those exegetical issues here and just focus on 
two of the educational implications that Aristotle’s locution is evidently meant to alert us 
to. To start with, here is the most relevant ‘Aristotelian’ quotation (I take it that the Magna 
Moralia was written by Aristotle or at least a faithful follower):
Now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves […]; as when we wish to 
see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we 
wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend (1915, 
1213a15–22).
The first thing to note here is that although Aristotle was a self-realist, believing that 
selfhood is objectively identifiable and not reducible to mere self-concept, he also sub-
scribed to the ‘soft realist’ credo that self-concept forms part of actual underlying self-
hood, in the same way that the mirror which mirrors the furniture in a room is also part 
of that furniture (Kristjánsson 2010, Chap. 2). Aristotle thus considered it of paramount 
interest (e.g. in terms of our potential character growth) that our views about who we are 
correspond to who we really are ‘deep down’. However, he realised that we are often lack-
ing in self-transparency and need someone who knows us well to correct our self-concep-
tions. This is why contemporary neo-Aristotelians are sceptical of self-report instruments 
to ‘measure’ character and recommend peer-reports and other more objective measures for 
triangulation (Kristjánsson 2015, Chap. 3). So the first educational implication to be drawn 
from Aristotle’s self-theory is that character friends are invaluable for self-knowledge in 
the sense that they (often) know us better than we do ourselves. For example, a soulmate is 
likely to notice much earlier than I do that I have lost my zest for life and am sinking into 
depression. In general, ‘we are able to observe our neighbours more than ourselves, and to 
observe their actions more than our own’ (Aristotle 1985, p. 258 [1169b33–35]).
However, there is a second and perhaps more controversial implication lurking inside 
the above citation, about which Andrea Veltman (2004), for one, has written a penetrating 
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paper. Because of the co-ordination and resonance of souls, involved in true soulmateship, 
Aristotle clearly thinks that I can learn facts about myself—including my current state of 
character and its potential for growth—by looking at how my character friends react and 
act, as their reactions are likely to mirror mine (although the latter will be opaque to my 
own introspection). So there are actually two reasons for why ‘the self-sufficing man will 
require friendship in order to know himself’ (1915, 1213a23–26).
I said that the second reason may be more controversial because it seems to assume that 
(a) we have privileged access to an understanding of other people’s character traits—when 
we see those being exercised in action—that is somehow, in principle, unavailable in the 
case of our own traits, and (b) we can identify those viewed traits as being the same as our 
own, although lack of direct self-knowledge prevents us from having immediate access to 
the self-traits with which we are meant to juxtapose the friend’s traits. Aristotle seems to 
forget here his own insistence on how good character is individually adjusted to persons’ 
different temperaments and social situations so that people who would count as overall 
equal in virtue and able to form character friendships as soulmateships could, in fact, be 
very different in terms of detailed character profiles, rather than just character-look-alikes. 
One of them, could, for example, be strong already on compassion but weak on honesty but 
the other strong on honesty while weak on compassion.
My qualms over the second of those implications notwithstanding, Aristotle does make 
a strong case for self-examination being dependent upon other-examination, and self-
knowledge upon other-knowledge: in particular the intimate knowledge that the character 
friend has of who I am. We are beings prone to self-deceptions and positive illusions about 
ourselves. Friends can correct for those, to a certain extent at least, either by direct criti-
cism, as noted in the second mechanism of moral learning above, or simply by being there 
for us as a ‘mirror’ to look into.
This epistemological mechanism holds the key to understanding one highly contested 
claim about character friendship, namely that it cannot be executed between vicious peo-
ple: a claim that turns many theorists off Aristotle’s moralised account of deep friendship 
and towards an aestheticised one (see e.g. Nehamas 2016, esp. pp. 60–61). Almost the 
only good reason that Aristotle finds for the termination of character friendships is if the 
friend becomes ‘incurably vicious’ (1985, p. 244 [1165b15–35]). One can understand that 
claim fairly superficially as a counter-example to the proverb that the sun never becomes 
worse for shining on the dunghill. It may attest to character flaws in oneself to want to 
mingle with the vicious and doing so can, then, exacerbate those flaws. However, Aristo-
tle is making a more profound claim here than just warning against the contagious perils 
of moral pollution. He offers an extended argument showing that complete vice precludes 
self-knowledge, which in turn precludes self-love; and as lack of self-love prevents one 
from loving others in the philia sense (Aristotle 1985, pp. 246–247 [1166b1–25]), the very 
foundations of any edifying character friendship have been shattered.
So the upshot of Aristotle’s the-friend-as-another-self conceptualisation is actually quite 
radical. It is not only that we need character friends to achieve self-knowledge which, in 
turn, is necessary to enable us to (continue to) reform our character. Even more impor-
tantly, without some measure of (developmentally growing) self-knowledge we are unable 
to make true friends in the first place as, bereft of the capacity to love ourselves because we 
do not know who we are, we are also unable to extend those feelings to others and to iden-
tify a rightful place for them in our lives.
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Concluding Remarks and Classroom Applications
The whole tenor of Aristotle’s discussion of all types of friendship is that they are develop-
mentally constituted and, in their most complete form as character friendship, education-
ally executed. There is no such things as friendship per se, but rather friendship at a certain 
developmental niveau, with its specific developmental assets and liabilities: qualitatively 
differentiated according to its educational affordances (Kristjánsson 2020a). I have argued 
in this article that the raison d’être of character friendship is mutual character develop-
ment. ‘Good people’s life together allows the cultivation of virtue’ (Aristotle 1985, p. 259 
[1170a11–13]).
In the preceding section I identified three educational mechanisms unique to character 
friendship. To demonstrate that these mechanisms carry traction outside of the hermeti-
cally sealed hothouse of Aristotelian scholarship it suffices to mention that they correspond 
substantially to the three ‘fruits of friendship’ that Francis Bacon identified much later: 
‘peace in the affections’, ‘support of the judgement’ and the bringing together of the ‘many 
kernels’ that friendship has, ‘like pomegranate’, into a coherent whole (Bacon 1910–14, 
p. 59). It bears repeating that identifying these mechanisms is not the same as instrumen-
talising friendship. The person who forms character friendships just in order to gain self-
knowledge, for example, has not so much misunderstood what character friendship is for as 
what such friendship really is. The following analogy from C. S. Lewis says all there is to 
say about instrumentalisation: ‘Say your prayers in a garden early, ignoring steadfastly the 
dew, the birds and the flowers, and you will come away overwhelmed by its freshness and 
joy; go there in order to be overwhelmed and […] nothing will happen you’ (1960, p. 39).
The educational argument about character friendships may appear to have proceeded at 
a fairly high level of abstraction so far. What does it mean for actual educational practice? 
In other words, what would be the implications of taking the title of this article seriously, 
about character friendship as a ‘method of moral education’? The first thing to note is that 
nothing I have said above undermines the educational value of standard role-model educa-
tion, activated through admiration and emulation. Such education may be particularly apt 
for projecting on our mental screens visions of the good life, either for the sake of adoption 
or consolidation. It may even, contra Aristotle, inspire us towards radical (epiphanic) self-
change—although, again contra Aristotle, attraction to abstract ideals may be even better at 
leveraging such change (Kristjánsson 2020b, Chap. 6). However, for the everyday ‘plank 
by plank’ (Hursthouse 1999, p. 165) revision and refining of our moral character traits, 
I think Aristotle was right: nothing beats the critical collaboration with close character 
friends who are psychologically intimate enough with us to know where the shoe pinches.
The most obvious educational implication of this view is that teachers should encourage 
the formation of close friendships between their students, young or old, and help enlighten 
them on the merits of turning those into true character friendships. To be sure, best-friend-
ship dissolutions are often profoundly painful, and one may thus have some sympathy with 
the UK head teacher who discouraged pupils from forming ‘best friendships’ so as to avoid 
the pain and upset caused by fallings out (as reported in Healy 2015, p. 196, n. 1). However, 
for those who believe schools have any role to play in moral education—a view shared by 
the vast majority of teachers and parents—a no-best-friends policy in schools seems to be 
not only unduly paternalistic but, indeed, profoundly inimical to the moral development of 
the child (Healy 2017a). The idea that rather than to have a best friend, children should be 
‘friends with everyone’ bespeaks an inadequate grasp of moral psychology and a conflation 
of the concepts of friendliness on the one hand and (true) friendship, on the other (cf. Healy 
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2015). Taken to the other extreme, a strict utilitarian demand to maximise overall utility at 
every turn would put a positive non-supererogatory obligation on teachers to play ‘friend-
ship matchmakers’, in order to enhance the flourishing of the greatest number of children 
in their care (cf. Collins 2013). While one may grumble that the strict utilitarian demand 
is counter-productive in the long run from the utilitarian perspective itself because of its 
extreme burn-out-threatening demandingness, in this case the excess of playing friendship 
matchmaker seems closer to the golden mean of appropriate teacher intervention than the 
deficiency of ignoring or discouraging the role of student friendships.
Should teachers take the extra step of offering themselves as unequal character friends 
(mentors) to children? Patricia White probably echoes the voices of many teachers when 
she argues that ‘norms of impartiality’ and the dangers of ‘ethical complexities’ rule out 
intimate friendships with individual students (1990, pp. 88–89). Contrast that view, how-
ever, with the Montessori approach to teacher–pupil relationships, according to which it 
is incumbent on every teacher to act in loco parentis and offer pupils domestic affection 
through frequent hugs and approaches towards deep personal friendships (Martin 1992, 
esp. pp. 16–19, 39). One could retort, first, that the Casa dei Bambini was a school type for 
a special kind of deprived children and, second, that more serious worries obtrude about 
potential abuse in the present age than in Montessori’s time. However, nowadays no less 
than in decades past, there are children who—being shy, withdrawn or deprived of domes-
tic affection—crave for that special attention from a significant adult, and by resisting 
friendships with such students, teachers are closing down spaces that would enhance their 
flourishing (see a moving example of teacher–pupil friendship in Shuffelton 2012). Moreo-
ver, teacher attention is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Showing a needy child special 
attention does not automatically mean than other, less needy, children are being neglected, 
from the point of view of impartiality. At any rate, viewing students as friends seems to be 
a healthier attitude than viewing them as clients or customers, as seems to be demanded by 
a neo-liberal agenda of schooling (cf. Noddings 2005, esp. p. 102).
White (1990, p. 87) does agree at least that teachers should encourage student friend-
ships by taking them seriously and reinforcing them. How to do so obviously depends on 
the nature of the friendship in question (e.g. if it can be considered character friendship) 
and the age-related mode of the friendship, as it typically shifts from concerns with equal-
ity and reciprocity in children aged 8–12 to mutuality and understanding for those aged 
9–14 (Rawlins 2008, pp. 39–40). Encouraging student friendship does not mean introduc-
ing ‘friendship lessons’ in schools or placing friendship explicitly on the school curriculum 
as a discrete subject matter (as noted by Healy 2017b, although a recent UK governmental 
document seems to recommend just that: Department for Education 2019). Nevertheless, it 
means incorporating discussions of friendship in any curriculum that is geared towards the 
moral education of the child, however conceptualised and labelled. What must be avoided 
at the same time is the unnecessary institutionalising of something that is deeply personal 
in nature; the sense of non-instrumentalism and voluntariness must be retained (cf. Enslin 
and Hedge 2019, on academic friendships). Ruehl’s (2018) clarion call for a whole new 
educational framework grounded in a philosophy of friendship may sound like a menac-
ingly radical idea. Yet, given the links between friendship and mutual trust, delineated 
above—not to mention the flow-like qualities, conducive to learning outcomes (Csikszent-
mihalyi 1990), supervening upon the actualisation of true friendship—the idea of turning 
the classroom into a community of character friendships may seem less radical and far-
fetched than it appears at first sight.
We become friends by practising friendships, just as we become musicians by play-
ing music. The process of learning to become friends is thus essentially an educational 
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process. Those are perhaps little more than truisms. However, I have proposed to make 
a more radical claim in this article: namely, that making close friends for character is not 
only an educational process but rather that its ultimate telos is educational at its very core. 
Aristotle’s obscure references to the character friend as ‘another self’ are probably not best 
understood as references to human selves interwoven in some ‘woolly pseudo-mystical 
way’ (Hitz 2011, p. 17), but rather as remainders of the fact that cultivating deep friend-
ships is an integrated collaborative activity, involving both an educational process and an 
educational outcome. My radical claim of character friendship as a ‘method’ of moral edu-
cation may need to be modified and reframed if we choose to understand ‘method’ in a 
formal and operationalisable sense, such as a rigorous teacher-led Kohlbergian discussion 
about a moral dilemma in a classroom. However, if we understand ‘method’ here as a strat-
egy that can be encouraged and nourished systematically by an educator (teacher, parent, 
etc.), for example through subtle hints and nudges, to help students grow morally, then 
there is nothing speaking against character friendships being referred to as a ‘method’ in 
this more permissive sense.
As iron sharpens iron, character friends sharpen each other and contribute towards col-
laborative moral growth, conducive to both individual and communal flourishing. Educa-
tors, at all levels of the school system, need to take note.
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